The Bulgargaz-BOTAS Deal: Facades, Traps, and a Long Gas Chain
The BOTAS agreement can only be understood through several interconnected lenses. To ignore any one of them is to produce an analysis that is not merely incomplete, but actively misleading. This distinction is critical now, as a deliberate effort is underway to concentrate all political blame on President Rumen Radev. That narrative conveniently masks the true masterminds of the deal and the long-standing chain of dependencies linking political and corporate actors who have profited for years from mediating Moscow’s interests within the Bulgarian and EU gas markets.
Formal political responsibility does indeed lie with the President and his caretaker governments. However, halting the analysis there transforms accountability into manipulation. In reality, Bulgaria’s natural gas sector has been managed for sixteen years by a tight-knit network centered on Bulgartransgaz EAD and Bulgargaz EAD – entities structurally and culturally bound to Moscow after decades of exclusive reliance on Russian imports. The BOTAS agreement is not a rupture with this past; it is a new link in an unbroken chain.
The True Architect
From initial concept to final contract, the BOTAS deal was steered by Gazprom’s most trusted interlocutor in Bulgaria: Vladimir Malinov, CEO of Bulgartransgaz EAD. Malinov was the key operator behind TurkStream and every major Russian gas scheme involving Bulgaria.
During the construction of TurkStream, Gazprom provided the strategic framework within which Malinov operated. His role has remained consistent:
- Setting strategic parameters;
- Negotiating with Gazprom and its subcontractors;
- Drafting and steering contractual texts;
- Distributing roles – pre-agreed with Moscow – to ministers, Bulgargaz, and political leaders.
TurkStream and the BOTAS agreement are structurally inseparable; they are two components of the same design. Neither then-Energy Minister Rosen Hristov nor President Radev ever possessed a full view of the geopolitical architecture of these deals. This mirrors an earlier episode where then-Energy Minister Temenuzhka Petkova was pressured – by Malinov via Boyko Borisov – into signing the TurkStream roadmap with Gazprom. Once again, the political leadership served as a facade, absorbing public outcry while the chief architect remained in the shadows.
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Why the Presidency Was Not Enough
This is the point most deliberately ignored: President Radev alone was insufficient for Malinov to succeed with his scheme. This is not merely a political arrangement; it is a deeply embedded business and corruption mechanism—the “adhesive” binding segments of the Bulgarian elite to the Kremlin. These schemes, designed in coordination with Gazprom and Russian intelligence services, do not depend on any single Bulgarian politician.
Rumen Radev’s caretaker governments happened to be in office at a critical moment of execution. Their involvement was unavoidable, but they were never in the driver’s seat. This raises glaring questions: Where were the security services? Where was the energy regulator (CEWR)? The losses from the BOTAS contract are currently crippling Bulgargaz and burdening consumers, yet the institutions designed to prevent this were conspicuously absent.
The President was integrated based on a cold calculation:
- He lacks the reflex for independent resistance to Moscow.
- He is unlikely to react decisively even when national interests are harmed when it comes to pleasing Moscow.
- He can absorb significant reputational damage without destabilizing the underlying system.
In this context, he functions as a “useful idiot” rather than a mastermind. While Radev, Peevski, and Borisov exchange rhetorical blows, no one touches BTG’s CEO Malinov, and no one exposes the architecture of the scheme.
Cross-Party Collusion
Boyko Borisov’s open defense of the BOTAS agreement, promising it to act as “money printing press,” reveals a shared interest that transcends party lines. Equally telling is Delyan Peevski’s silence in January 2023. While polishing a Euro-Atlantic image, Peevski remained quiet despite having full knowledge of the negotiations via Malinov. This was not ignorance; it was coordination.
The Logic of the “Turkish Mix”
For years, BOTAS has sought to become a regional hub, exporting a “Turkish gas mix” to the Balkans and the EU. TurkStream currently blocks this ambition because Gazprom has reserved 100% of its capacity and there is still no EU ban on Russian pipe gas imports. Furthermore, the deliberate blocking of reverse-flow capacity on the Trans-Balkan pipeline toward Ukraine—a Malinov-era decision—further aligned Bulgarian infrastructure pace of diversification with Gazprom’s wishes.
Since Russian-gas-only – TurkStream operates at peak capacity, the only realistic channel for larger gas volumes from Turkey is the Strandzha entry point and the reverse flow of the Trans-Balkan pipeline.
Circumventing Brussels
For years, an interconnection agreement between Bulgartransgaz and BOTAS was impossible because Brussels would not legalize a structure that replicated a monopoly at the EU’s external border. The workaround was a tripartite agreement between Bulgartransgaz, Bulgargaz, and BOTAS.
Formally, BOTAS uses Bulgargaz’s booked capacity with regulatory approval. In reality, EU regulatory logic is circumvented, granting BOTAS a privileged position to expand across EU markets. While Bulgargaz tried—and failed—to escape a trap requiring mandatory payments for capacity it could not use, BOTAS gained flexible, real-world access to the Bulgarian system.
Drawing Radev into the Script
To justify political intervention, Malinov exploited a genuine failure: Bulgargaz’s inability to secure LNG slots at Revithoussa (Greece) and delays at the Alexandroupolis FSRU. Malinov’s “quick fix” was access to Turkish LNG terminals, packaged within the BOTAS arrangement. This required presidential-level engagement with Ankara, where energy decisions are centralized in a single office – the President’s. This is precisely where Radev fitted into Malinov’s script.
Preparing for “Day X”
This entire legal infrastructure is a prelude to “Day X”- the moment the EU finally bans Russian gas imports. When that day arrives, the only remaining route for Russian gas will be its rebranding as a “Turkish mix.”
The Turkish mix cannot flow, at least at present, through TurkStream (which is reserved 100% for Russian pipe gas), leaving the reverse flow of the Trans-Balkan pipeline as the only viable corridor. Turkey’s BOTAS is already working to multiply the exit capacity from Malkoclar. Achieving the necessary volumes requires investment, but the groundwork is already laid.
The Prosecutor’s Trap
Once Rumen Radev was ensnared, a second trigger was activated: the “Corrupt Radev deal” narrative promoted by Peevski and Borisov. However, the Peevsky and Borissov controlled prosecutor’s office did not seek indictments; it sought leverage. By keeping Radev’s BOTAS case permanently open, they can fire the weapon once and if the President leaves office and maintain a tool of political control, ensuring Radev remains vulnerable when necessary.
Facade vs. Architecture
Rumen Radev is not the core of these gas schemes designs. While public anger is directed at the facade, the masterminds remain untouched. They are the real ‘untouchables’ proving invinvibles for EPPO’s investigations and indictments for the botched Vertical Gas Corridor and UGS Chiren capacity expansion projects. In the meantime, all is set for the mass rebranding of Russian gas continue uninterrupted. This is the real stake of the BOTAS deal. It cannot be understood in isolation; it is the sister-project to TurkStream, managed by the same actors, following the same logic, and reinforcing the same long gas chain.
Ilian Vassilev
