Donald Trump Jr.’s Visit to Eastern Europe: Business and Geopolitical Context
Information published in Romanian media about Donald Trump Jr.’s upcoming trip to Eastern Europe at the end of April 2025, covering Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, and Belgrade, has sparked both anticipation and unease. Although he holds no official role in the administration of his father, President Donald Trump, he serves as executive vice president of the Trump Organization alongside his brother Eric. Trump Jr. skillfully blends business interests with political influence, leveraging family connections to select which countries to visit and whom to meet. The leak of this visit’s details through Romanian media is no coincidence—it’s perceived as a provocation toward Romanian authorities, given the support Trump Jr. is expected to offer Georgescu and his candidate just a week before Romania’s presidential election. Even by modern U.S. standards, this amounts to a clear-cut case of interference in domestic affairs.
Geopolitical Background: Trade War and Trojan Horses
The geopolitical climate is turbulent amid an escalating U.S.-EU trade war. Washington imposed a universal 20% tariff on all imports effective April 5, 2025, a measure President Trump extended for an additional 90 days. The EU is preparing retaliatory tariffs worth €26 billion by mid-April. Against this backdrop, Trump Jr.’s choice of Eastern European capitals for his potential visit sends a clear message to Brussels: Washington aims to forge bilateral ties with the region, circumventing the European Commission. The objective is to explore the possibility of using these nations as allies against the EU and Western Europe. In each capital, Trump Jr. is anticipated to engage with politicians known for their anti-European, and often pro-Russian, stances.
Transactional Diplomacy
Though no official itinerary has been released, such a visit could underscore several priorities. Notably, Donald Trump Jr. is not a senior official from the Department of Defense, State Department, or Department of Energy making the trip, but a member of the Trump family. He is expected to gauge the willingness of his Bulgarian hosts to play a “constructive” role in the looming U.S.-EU trade battles, prioritizing potential U.S. political deals over EU solidarity. The Trump administration is increasingly aware that its hostility toward the EU carries a cost—evident in declining demand for U.S. military products and strategic goods (like energy), as well as prospective EU countermeasures targeting U.S. digital, banking, and financial services. Consequently, U.S. emissaries are placing growing emphasis on securing contracts with American firms. In Bulgaria alone, this includes AP1000 nuclear reactors and arms deals rumored to exceed $3 billion. In Serbia and Bulgaria, investments in energy and infrastructure may seek to counter Chinese influence—a recurring concern for the Trump family, as reflected in Trump Jr.’s 2024 remarks labeling China a “geopolitical threat” in Serbia. A similar narrative may unfold in Sofia, where the intensifying U.S.-China trade war could redirect Chinese goods to Europe, heightening pressure on local markets.
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The Trump Organization seldom invests its own capital; its model hinges on licensing the Trump brand for propety developments and managing properties funded by others. In Bulgaria, this might manifest as brokering energy deals, particularly involving Russian and U.S. gas via Turkish Stream and the Vertical Gas Corridor—strategic assets linking the country to broader geopolitics. There’s also the possibility of a new Trump Tower or similar real estate venture, potentially including golf courses, the leisure industry, emerging from these discussions.
The Borisov-Peevski Tandem
In Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski tandem aims to position themselves as Trump’s primary points of contact and business partners, seeking the Family’s geopolitical backing to expand business schemes, building on the success of the Turk Stream. Under current conditions, the only EU entering Russian gas transmission pipe needs to be “safeguarded” from the EU’s plan to fully phase out Russian gas by 2028. To this end, the tandem is exploring options to defy Brussels, potentially negotiating deals akin to those offered by Trump-affiliated businessmen to Germany for restart the Nord Stream or to Ukraine for its gas transmission network. Political support for Russian gas through Turk Stream from Hungary’s Orbán, Serbia’s Vučić, and Slovakia’s Fico is insufficient—and all countries require White House patronage to succeed.
This builds on a precedent of prior collaboration: during Trump’s first term, the Family, via Jared Kushner, aided Gazprom in advancing Turk Stream through Saudi Aramco’s subcontractor, Arcad Construction, evading U.S. congressional sanctions and exploiting EU regulatory loopholes with Gazprom’s legal advisors. Then PM Borisov has acknowledged that during his 2019 White House visit, Trump encouraged him to pursue and construct the Turk Stream despite congressional sanctions. Now, Trump Jr. could deepen this partnership, serving as a conduit for consolidate partnership with Bulgarian figures “akin to Orbán.”
Beyond arms contracts and political patronage, Borisov and Peevski seek to leverage U.S. interest in Westinghouse’s deployment of the seventh and eighth AP1000 reactors at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. For both the U.S. company and the U.S. government, the appeal lies not only in substantial revenues from the sales but also in the prospect of licensing the reactor across the EU via Bulgaria’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA)—an entity ill-equipped financially and staffing-wise for the task. Renowned experts, such as Professor Georgi Kaschiev, highlighted on Alternativata the absence of a proven economic case in feasibility studies, noting that the reactor’s costs exceed $13 billion and energy prices could surpass €200/MWh, rendering the project unviable. With Kozloduy’s Units 5 and 6 operational until 2047–2049, and renewable energy sources—unmanageable by nuclear reactors—on the rise, additional capacity is neither domestically necessary nor assured for export.
The Borisov-Peevski tandem’s transactional diplomacy clearly aims to lift Peevski’s Magnitsky Act sanctions. If economic justifications fall short, continued public investment in the AP1000 project might prompt Westinghouse to lobby the U.S. government on Peevski’s behalf. Another potential offer to Trump Jr involves sharing proceeds from transporting additional Russian gas quantities via the Turk Stream, the Vertical Gas Corridor, and the Chiren underground storage facility.
Who Might Trump Jr. Meet in Bulgaria?
Attention in Bulgaria may center on his meetings with local “Trumpists.” Though Trump Jr lacks official status, President Radev might receive him to lend a veneer of statesmanship and counterbalance the Borisov-Peevski’s political overtures. Radev’s roster of prominent Western guests has thinned lately, making it unlikely he’d decline hosting Trump Jr. Given Trump’s European disdain profile, his son might meet with nationalist, anti-European parties like “Vazrazhdane” (Renaissance). However, a meeting with its leader, Kostadinov, while feasible, offers little strategic value to the American visitor. Kostadinov remains a minor figure in Russia’s orbit, lacking independent traction and unable to broaden his narrow rhetoric into mainstream Bulgarian politics. For its broader objectives, Russia relies on Peevski, Borisov, and Radev, relegating Kostadinov to a radical fringe role.
A public meeting with Peevski, sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act, seems, for now, improbable but isn’t entirely off the table. The Trump family is known for flouting convention, and with sufficient incentive, they’ve conducted “business” meetings despite norms. Still, Peevski likely plays a secondary role here, with Borisov taking the lead as the primary “image cleaner” for his ally. This aligns with well-informed diplomatic sources noting that, over the past 18 months, Borisov has consistently lobbied senior U.S. and British figures to lift Peevski’s sanctions in every meeting.
Borisov’s vested interest is clear in his long-term alliance with Peevski, the leader of DPS – Novo Nachalo – “New Beginning” likely holding a critical trump card—support for Borisov’s presidential bid in the elections slated for late 2026.
Public Funds in Action
A robust lobbying campaign in the U.S., indirectly financed through Bulgartransgaz’s public procurement, underpins these efforts. A Bulgarian company, a perennial favorite in securing these contracts and allegedly under Peevski’s control, has reaped hundreds of millions of leva—from Turk Stream to the expansion of the Chiren gas storage facility and now the modernization of the transmission network. The scheme is straightforward: competitors are sidelined on technicalities, and after securing the contracts, the company channels a portion of the funds to fuel, what is essentially, GERB and Peevski’s lobbying campaign in the US, ostensibly framed as a corporate push to “expand business.” At the core of these operations stands Vladimir Malinov, Bulgartransgaz’s CEO. It’s not implausible that Trump Jr.’s visit stems from such “lobbying” endeavors.
Why Is Trump Jr. Crucial for the Survival of Bulgaria’s Autocratic Model?
While under US and UK sanctions, Peevski’s prospects—both in his business, currently managed through lawyers, and his political ascent—are severely constrained. He and Borisov need a powerful transatlantic political patron to fill the void left by Angela Merkel. Neither Orbán nor Erdoğan can unlock doors or confer legitimacy within the EU and NATO. Among Western European leaders, including those in Britain, finding such a backer seems unlikely. The unindicted status of Vladimir Malinov and Peevski’s shadow role in attacks on Bulgaria’s EPPO prosecutor, Teodora Georgieva, tied to a 20-million-leva racketeering scheme, only heighten the tandem’s unease. An EU-level investigation, will beyond the tandem’s reach and influence, looms as a real threat.
The MRF-Novo Nachalo leader envisions “coming to power” through an inevitable autocratic model, building on Borisov’s relatively more democratic framework. Delyan Peevski cannot establish himself as a national leader without resorting to repression and ruthless tactics—not least because he faces 85 percent public disapproval. Branded the face of Bulgarian corruption by the Magnitsky Act and perceived as the head of a “political mafia,” his only path to power lies through suppression, preceded by the lifting of sanctions against him.
The Strategy: Playing the Tune of Conservatism
Borisov and Peevski have long labored to forge an ideological link with the MAGA movement. First, they funded several local “conservative” think tanks, including the Bulgarian arm of Gallup International, to act as ideological conduits to the new U.S. administration. These initiatives, bolstered by Viktor Orbán’s financial support, could gain momentum during Donald Trump Jr.’s prospective visit, with media amplifying pro-American rhetoric under the banner of “conservatism and fighting back Soros liberalism.” It’s no coincidence that the first note of this conservative Peevskian spring has already sounded—on April 9, 2025, the Group of Conservatives and Patriots in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe welcomed DPS-Novo Nachalo into its fold at the behest of Orbán’s Fidesz party—just in time for the party leader to flaunt his newly minted conservative “credentials” to Donald Trump Jr.
It’s reasonable to infer that a parallel process is underway to secure DPS-Novo Nachalo’s entry into the “Patriots for Europe” group in the European Parliament, again mediated by Fidesz. Orbán’s moves in Peevski’s favor align with Borisov’s interests, raising a pivotal question: if Peevski emerges as the new Orbán in Bulgaria, might he one day control GERB entirely once Borisov ascends to the presidency? This offers another telltale sign that Peevski and Borisov’s interests converge, and Borisov’s successor may not hail from his own party.
Second, numerous oligarchs in Russia and Bulgaria sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act have found encouragement in actions and statements from President Trump’s administration, such as effectively stalling the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and proposing a “golden visa” for a $5 million U.S. investment—amounts both members of the Bulgarian ruling tandem can readily muster to reshape their futures. Yet, a hurdle persists: a sanctioned individual on the SDN list cannot secure that golden visa. While not impossible in today’s Trump-led America, where the unthinkable often becomes reality, it requires intervention “from above.” Donald Trump Jr. likely represents Peevski’s hope of escaping the Magnitsky stranglehold. Even if successful US sanctions revocation, however, British sanctions would remain in place.
Political Façade vs. Real Stakes
To lend a “statesmanlike” PR air to their potential meetings with Donald Trump Jr., Borisov—and possibly Peevski—may propose discussing pressing geopolitical topics, such as Bulgaria’s stance in the U.S.-EU trade war, Black Sea security challenges, and prospective strategic deals with the U.S.
Even if tangible outcomes prove elusive, the media spotlight and perceived closeness to the Trump family validate their investment in Donald Trump’s visit. Yet, their gambit risks backfiring. Trump Jr.’s backing of Vučić in Serbia has yielded few dividends for the Serbian president—quite the opposite. Nor has it elevated Orbán’s stature in Hungary or the EU. Rising anti-Trump sentiment across Europe—particularly in Germany, Borisov’s longtime anchor—could transform the Trumpist label into a liability.
Trump’s policies, grounded in self-interest and isolationism, envision vassals rather than equal allies—a distinction they may grasp too late.
