Trump and the Backdoor Exit on Ukraine
What may seem like a strategic pivot is, in fact, a retreat cloaked in rhetoric — with profound implications for Eastern Europe and the world at large.
As the oft-attributed Churchillian quip goes, “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.” Whether or not Churchill actually said it, the observation remains apt in describing how the U.S. has historically approached complex foreign policy challenges — Ukraine included.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump appears poised to frame the termination of the Ukraine peace effort as a geopolitical masterstroke. In reality, the move is based on a familiar tactic: deflection, blame-shifting, and appeasement masquerading as diplomacy. This is not a new doctrine, but rather a resurrection of Chamberlain’s approach — complete with scapegoats, backroom deals, and authoritarian sympathies.
While the spectacle is distinctly American, its shockwaves are global, particularly in Eastern Europe. Local “Trumpists” have built their political strategies around the fantasy of a grand Trump-Putin reconciliation, one that would unlock business opportunities and lift international sanctions. Trump Jr.’s visit to the region marks the culmination of a coordinated effort to subvert the EU through trade deals with East European political oligarchs — deals funded by Russian energy revenues. The ultimate aim is to create a pro-Trump alliance of autocrats in Southeastern Europe, which the U.S. President could leverage to undermine the EU’s ability to coordinate policy — particularly when it conflicts with U.S. or Russian interests. Romania remains the missing link in this geopolitical equation, explaining the considerable resources deployed by the Trump camp — including Trump Jr.’s visit — to sway local elections and defeat the pro-EU, pro-NATO candidate.
Bulgaria as a Case Study in Wishful Thinking
Nowhere is this delusion more pronounced than in Bulgaria, where certain parts of the political elite are betting on a second Trump presidency to whitewash corruption, restart Russian energy projects, and trade European alignment for raw political access. They believe Trump’s “backdoor diplomacy” will override the transatlantic consensus on Russia, paving the way for new gas deals, the rehabilitation of sanctioned oligarchs, and the revival of frozen infrastructure projects like the Belene Nuclear Plant and the expansion of Russian gas flows into the EU.
But the war in Ukraine — and Europe’s firm response — has closed the door on business-as-usual with the Kremlin. The notion that Russian gas, rebranded via Turkey or wrapped in American packaging under the label of the Vertical Gas Corridor, could reenter the European market under a Trump presidency is not only naïve — it’s strategically reckless.
The geopolitical winds are shifting in Europe’s favor. If the continent accelerates its defense and weapons production, it could reduce its reliance on U.S. arms, rendering American leadership less critical than it once was. Furthermore, the EU holds the stronger hand in negotiations with Moscow, particularly on Putin’s key objectives: regaining access to the EU market and reclaiming frozen Russian state assets in the EU.
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Trump’s Reversal: Blaming the Victim, Embracing the Aggressor
In the likely event that peace negotiations stall or fail, Trump will not hold Putin accountable. His enduring business ties and personal admiration for strongmen remain unchanged. Instead, he will cast Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the scapegoat — an “unreliable partner,” too inflexible to accept the “realities” of war. Even if Europe offers to fund Ukraine’s defense, Trump could block arms deliveries — positioning himself as the reluctant peacemaker, betrayed by others.
This narrative follows a classic authoritarian logic: the leader never errs. Like Stalin before him — and Putin today — Trump refuses to admit mistakes. Failures are reframed as betrayals by others.
China: The Unwelcome Reality Check
Sooner or later, Trump’s worldview will crash against the immovable reality of China. Beijing doesn’t engage in cable-news theatrics or symbolic diplomacy. If the U.S. truly intends to counter Chinese influence, it will need allies — not just rhetorically, but structurally.
But why should America’s traditional partners, from the EU to NATO, rally behind Trump after he has spent his first 90 days in office attacking and undermining them? The days of automatic transatlantic solidarity are over. When Europe followed Washington’s lead in banning Huawei from 5G networks, it did so out of trust and shared democratic values. That trust is now fractured — and Trump is the reason why.
The fallout is more than diplomatic. It’s reputational — and reputation, as any seasoned executive knows, is capital. Goodwill may be intangible, but its consequences are concrete. Trump, who prides himself on his deal-making prowess, still hasn’t grasped this fundamental rule of global economics.
Eastern Europe: Between Hope and Hostage
Across Eastern Europe, the specter of Trump’s return has emboldened a wave of opportunists seeking to escape accountability, rewrite narratives, and revive profitable links with Moscow. These so-called “Trumpists” aren’t ideologues — they are transactional actors, loyal to the highest bidder. Often, loyalty is not just about personal enrichment, but about political protection for deeply entrenched networks of corruption.
Many of them are positioned to generate substantial gains — both independently and in collaboration with fellow autocrats in the region — and are prepared to share the spoils with members of the Trump family. Their hope is that a second Trump term would restore governance via personal emissaries rather than institutions, bypassing the U.S. State Department, the intelligence community, and the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), just as it did during the “TurkStream” era.
In Bulgaria, this fantasy is especially vivid. Elements of the so-called deep state are counting on U.S.-backed relief from Magnitsky Act sanctions, protection from EU prosecutors, and renewed freedom to serve as intermediaries in covert energy deals. Their allegiance is dictated not by principle, but by profit.
But geopolitics is unforgiving toward fantasy. Even within the first 100 days of a possible Trump presidency, these illusions are already beginning to crack. The Kremlin’s economic backdoor is firmly shut — and Europe won’t permit Russian interests to be laundered under a different flag.
The Cost of a Fabricated Peace
Donald Trump may be laying the groundwork for his next “deal” — a handshake with Vladimir Putin, marketed as a breakthrough for peace in Ukraine. But let there be no illusions: this would not be peace. It would be a betrayal of democratic values, the unraveling of long-standing alliances, and an open door to authoritarian resurgence.
For those in Eastern Europe — and beyond — who choose to follow Trump down this path, the reckoning will be swift and unforgiving. The backdoor may seem like an elegant exit from the stage of war, but in reality, it leads only to a geopolitical dead end.
This is a delicate and complex situation, shaped by the broader dynamics of the war in Ukraine. For Putin, de-escalation has become a strategic imperative, which helps explain his recent overtures toward direct peace talks with President Zelensky. Yet in the context of deepening hostility between Russia and the European Union, the Trump family’s ability to reenter the region through business ventures — particularly those facilitated by local power brokers like Boyko Borissov or Delyan Peevski — remains severely limited. The current geopolitical environment simply doesn’t support such transactional reentry.
Ironically, the continuation of U.S. sanctions under the Magnitsky Act serves Trump’s interests better than their removal. As long as figures like Peevski remain under sanctions, Trump retains a powerful form of leverage. He can cast himself as the broker of potential relief — not through official policy shifts, but via informal, transactional channels. This isn’t about shared ideology; it’s about preserving leverage in a long-running zero-sum game.
In this framework, any prospective “deal-making” is unlikely to move through institutional channels. Instead, it would unfold via personal emissaries such as Steve Witkoff or Kirill Dmitriev — reviving the model used during the TurkStream negotiations. But such backchannel diplomacy depends heavily on a divided or distracted European Union. Without a fragmented EU or a weakened transatlantic front, even Trump’s most experienced operatives will find it difficult to circumvent existing legal and institutional constraints.
Ultimately, while the potential for backdoor maneuvers remains, it is tightly bounded by forces well beyond the reach of any single individual — even one as disruptive as Trump.
Ilian Vassilev
