Analyses & AlternativesFEATURED

The Kremlin’s Special Media Operation Ahead of the Putin-Trump Summit

How Russia Uses Controlled Leaks in The New York Times to Deceive the West and Undermine Ukraine’s Allies

On August 10, 2025, The New York Times published a carefully orchestrated leak suggesting that Dmitry Kozak, a long-time ally of Vladimir Putin, has lost influence after opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and proposing sweeping reforms, including curbing the power of the siloviki (security apparatus) and establishing an independent judiciary. According to anonymous sources “close to the Kremlin,” Western contacts, and a U.S. official, Kozak warned Putin of the war’s folly before February 2022 and, in 2023, proposed a plan to halt hostilities and pursue peace talks. Instead, his responsibilities were reportedly reassigned to Sergei Kiriyenko, a war supporter overseeing sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories. This revelation conveniently surfaces just days before a high-stakes summit between Putin and Trump in Alaska on August 15, 2025, where Russia has proposed Ukraine ceding the entire Donbas region in exchange for peace—a proposal Ukraine and Europe have rejected as a violation of international borders and a dismissal of Kyiv’s agency.

This is Moscow’s “now or never” moment. The Kremlin is leveraging this leak to create an illusion of internal dissent and reformist impulses, designed to persuade Trump and the West that a “deal” with Russia is within reach. Behind this façade lies a classic tactic of manipulation, aimed at fracturing the unity of Ukraine’s allies and convincing Trump to sideline Europe and Kyiv in pursuit of a quick resolution.

The Implausibility of Kozak’s Dissent

Only the most credulous observer of Kremlin dynamics would accept two premises. First, that Dmitry Kozak—a seasoned operative with unwavering loyalty to Vladimir Putin—would propose reining in the siloviki, the cornerstone of Putin’s regime, without his explicit endorsement. Kozak is no maverick; he has been instrumental in pivotal operations, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the orchestration of the Sochi Olympics, and the Minsk agreements of 2021–2022, where he served as Russia’s chief negotiator. His portfolio extends to sensitive missions in post-Soviet states like Moldova and Russia’s restive Southern Federal District. As head of the Presidential Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Kozak oversees a critical Kremlin unit that orchestrates psychological and informational operations across the post-Soviet sphere, targeting nations such as Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. The idea that he has fallen from grace is a tired Kremlin trope, deliberately amplified to cloak the regime’s vulnerabilities and self-serving motives in an aura of intrigue. In reality, Putin faces mounting pressure from a faltering economy and strained public finances, with war costs crippling Russia’s budget and forcing him to seek a respite through tactical maneuvers like this leak.

Kozak’s alleged “criticism” of the war, confined to ‘private’ conversations, is not an act of rebellion. Were it genuine, Putin—known for his intolerance of disloyalty, especially during wartime—would have swiftly removed him, as seen with figures like Yevgeny Prigozhin after his 2023 mutiny. Instead, this leak is a calculated tool to convince the West that “moderate” forces exist within the Kremlin, ready to compromise. This mirrors tactics used during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012), when he was portrayed as a liberal reformer promising modernization and anti-corruption measures, only for Putin to consolidate power behind the scenes. Similarly, the Prigozhin rebellion was exploited to project an image of Kremlin vulnerability, only to strengthen Putin’s grip thereafter.

The bait is familiar: Russia is waging war in Ukraine, but the Kremlin dangles the notion—swallowed by Western leaders in the past—that “this war isn’t ours; Putin won’t target us, only Ukraine.” This tactic was tested in 2008 during Russia’s invasion of Georgia and again in 2014 after Crimea’s annexation, when the West pinned hopes on the Minsk agreements, ignoring Moscow’s use of them to buy time for escalation. Now, ahead of the Alaska summit, with Trump known for his eagerness to strike deals with Putin, the Kremlin floats “peace talks” through Kozak to suggest Russia’s willingness to compromise—provided the West accepts Ukraine’s territorial losses. Ukrainian and European leaders, however, have made it clear that any agreement excluding Kyiv is “dead on arrival” and ineffective.

The Orchestrated Leak as a Kremlin Playbook

Second, it is unthinkable that a senior official, even one as close to Putin as Kozak, could float such a sensitive initiative at this critical juncture—described as Putin’s “moment of truth”—and have it reach Western media without being part of a meticulously staged scenario approved at the highest level. The Kremlin exerts ironclad control over its information ecosystem; leaks are either sanctioned or swiftly silenced. The NYTimes’ sources—“three people close to the Kremlin, a Western contact, and a U.S. official”—are conveniently anonymous, enabling manipulation. Discussions in expert circles and on social media already question whether this is a “PR piece commissioned by Kozak himself” or controlled disinformation, as the Kremlin routinely exploits Western media to amplify its narratives.

This leak is no journalistic scoop but a weapon in Russia’s hybrid warfare arsenal—carefully crafted disinformation to foster illusions of Kremlin infighting and reformist potential. Such operations are well-documented: they aim to mislead Western audiences, fuel diplomatic hopes for “deals” with Russia, and suggest that Putin’s regime can be tamed through concessions. For instance, after the March 2024 Moscow Mall terrorist attack, the Kremlin swiftly spread disinformation blaming Ukraine to deflect from the real perpetrators. Similarly, leaked documents about Kremlin power struggles in 2023 proved to be part of a broader disorientation campaign. Kozak’s “dissidence” is strategically convenient—it remains private to avoid undermining Putin but public enough to sow hope for change.

The West’s Persistent Blind Spot

The deeper issue lies in the West’s, particularly the U.S.’s, alarmingly low expertise on Kremlin dynamics. Accepting every controlled “insider” leak as a genuine signal from Russia’s elite is not just naïve but dangerous, as it plays into Moscow’s hands. Many U.S. analysts, preoccupied with domestic issues, underestimate Russia’s “active measures”—a sophisticated blend of propaganda, disinformation, and psychological operations honed by the KGB. This has led to past missteps, such as the Obama-era “reset” with Russia or the failure to heed warnings of the 2022 invasion. With Trump back in power, the risk is amplified: his advisors may see Kozak as a bridge to peace, unaware that it’s a trap.

In reality, this media spectacle reveals not Putin’s weakness but his control. Kozak retains access to the Russian leader, reinforcing the staged nature of his role. A true dissenter would have been sidelined entirely, as Prigozhin and Navalny were. Instead, this leak underscores Putin’s openness to dialogue—on his terms—ahead of a summit where he may demand concessions on Donbas or reduced support for Ukraine.

The Kozak operation is a stark reminder: the Kremlin does not change through “internal reformists” but only through resolute opposition. If the West falls for this ploy again, the cost will be borne by Ukraine—and all of Europe. As Trump prepares to meet Putin, the U.S. must resist the siren song of quick deals and recognize the leak for what it is: a calculated move in Russia’s long game of deception.

Ilian Vassilev

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *