How Temporary Will Zhelyazkov’s Government Be?

Possibilities and Limitations

This government, like any “temporary phenomenon” in our country, might hypothetically last longer than expected, though realistically, this seems improbable—though not entirely impossible. Ultimately, destiny is shaped by those in control.

In many ways, Zhelyazkov’s government will operate under relatively favorable conditions that previous administrations could only dream of. However, it will not be the opposition that brings this government down—it will be its own missteps.

Take the opposition, for example. Delyan Peevski wields significant influence within the government. As long as he secures what he needs to sustain his networks and fuel his populism, he will not jeopardize the administration. While the political reckoning for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) has been postponed for now, no one expects this government to provide financial or power-based arguments to Dogan’s faction in its rivalry with Peevski.

The “We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria” coalition (PP-DB) will likely support the government on matters such as eurozone accession and upholding European and Atlanticist values. At this stage, however, the coalition has not resolved its internal relationships and lacks a clear strategy or unified leadership to win future elections.

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Meanwhile, GERB and its leader, Boyko Borissov, can neutralize competition from PP-DB by adopting much of their platform, curbing corruption, and containing Peevski’s influence. Their success in this endeavor depends entirely on their own actions.

“Vazrajdane” will criticize the government, but given the party’s behind-the-scenes connections to GERB, its opposition is likely to be restrained, despite any dramatic rhetoric. Similarly, smaller parties like “Mech” may enter the fray but pose no substantial threat to power.

Rossen Zhelyazkov stands out as Borissov’s strongest player. However, to borrow a football analogy, the issue lies not so much with the players but with the coach and the strategy.

The Legacy of the Model

This government inherits and builds upon the framework established by Peevski’s caretaker administration. As such, it is immediately confronted with the fundamental issue of prioritizing public interest over the oligarchic, partisan, and clan-based interests that dominate governance.

While some argue that the period of initial capital accumulation has ended, this holds true only for select circles. For newer generations entrenched in the patronage networks of GERB, BSP, and DPS, this process is just beginning—or, more accurately, it remains as constant as the need for corruption. The political parties supporting this government have dispatched their representatives with a singular mission: to “absorb” funds collectively and simultaneously.

The absence of PP-DB from the ruling coalition denies Borissov and GERB an opportunity to exert reformist control over the government, implement governance rooted in principles, or prioritize national interests. The main threat to this administration will arise from unfinished or poorly executed initiatives and the unchecked selfishness of political factions engaging in “votes for money” deals.

The precarious balance of financial “sufficiency” could collapse at any moment. Should this occur, Peevski or ITN are unlikely to hesitate in unleashing extreme populism. Thus, at its outset, this administration already appears to be a government of appropriators.

A Gap Between Needs and Reality

The demands of the moment stand in stark contrast to the government’s likely actions. Discipline, strict control over public spending, and sweeping reforms are essential. If Bulgaria aspires to join the eurozone, fiscal restraint and proactive policy-making are not optional—they are imperative.

Claiming to prioritize eurozone membership while simultaneously implementing shock salary increases for security services—merely to secure their loyalty—undermines this goal.

Critical systems essential to societal, institutional, and economic functioning have reached their breaking point. Internal resources for self-regulation and renewal are depleted. This dire situation calls for decisive action, strategic planning, and readiness to enact profound structural changes to restore sustainability.

Lack of Strategic Thinking

Success in today’s complex environment depends on building networks for early warning, diagnosis, analyses, and reaction. This demands strategic thinking, long-term planning, and effective communication in building or joining alliances—qualities conspicuously lacking in the current government.

In an era of accelerating change and growing uncertainty, outdated, static approaches to strategic positioning no longer guarantee stability or prosperity. Despite Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union and NATO, the challenges remain significant. Orban and Fico continue to undermine EU unity, while Donald Trump has demonstrated a willingness to confront NATO allies such as Canada and Denmark.

The powerful man in the new administration Elon Musk, for his part, has interfered in the domestic politics of nearly all major U.S. allies in Europe. It seems inevitable that, just as he supported Georgescu in Romania, he will eventually lend support to a radical party in Bulgaria.

In this unstable geopolitical landscape, where and how should Bulgaria position itself? The answer is far from simple. Success requires systematic thinking, and precise political analysis, alongside the creation of new alliances and the capacity for swift, adaptive responses to evolving circumstances.

The Energy Sector as a Case Study

The energy sector exemplifies the systemic challenges Bulgaria faces. The decapitalization of public infrastructure in this sector has reached critical levels, rendering the system reliant on budgetary injections and the elimination of inefficiencies.

Failed projects—such as Bulgartransgaz’s capital intensive project ventures, Bulgargaz’s controversial Botas contract, and the underperformance of the Chaira power pump and storage plant—underscore the severity of the crisis. The new nuclear reactors project, whose costs and revenue potential remain unclear, further illustrate the lack of strategic direction. Meanwhile, billions are being spent, Gazprom’s interests are being prioritized, and national solutions to mitigate the Green Deal’s impact remain elusive.

The Lukoil assets sale deal highlights this failure of strategic vision. The potential change in ownership of Bulgaria’s most important industrial asset is being observed with ostensible indifference, while national interests remain unprotected amidst unprecedented lobbying from different power groups.

Reforms and Vision

This cabinet’s capacity for reform is highly questionable, given that the very parties supporting it are responsible for creating many of the existing problems. The deeper issue, however, is their inability to rise above their own design limitations.

At best, they are “midfield ” intermediaries, incapable of treating corruption or delivering breakthrough reforms. Reform requires vision and leadership—qualities that are evidently lacking in this administration.

The Cabinet’s Biggest Weakness

The greatest flaw in Zhelyazkov’s government lies in the expectation that ministers will serve party interests over the government’s collective goals. While Bulgaria has never been wealthier, this prosperity has failed to translate into economic growth or sustainable development.

Instead, resources are squandered on corruption projects aimed at preserving power and enriching select groups. Infrastructure development remains inadequate due to the persistent “corruption tax” siphoning off funds. Consequently, capital program funds and EU allocations remain chronically underutilized.

A Formula for the Government’s “Longevity”

Scandals will break from day one, stemming from the unresolved issues inherited from the caretaker administration. Zhelyazkov, one of GERB’s most capable figures, will face unrelenting pressure from the many competing factions within the government.

The only path to “longevity” lies in curbing the appetites of political players and implementing meaningful reforms—a mission that seems almost impossible. Nevertheless, let us hope that reality defies these grim expectations.

Ilian Vassilev